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United States v. Carlton: 
RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION OF AN 
AMENDMENT TO 26 
U.S.C. § 2057 (1982, 
SUPP. IV 1986) DID 
NOT VIOLATE DUE 
PROCESS. 
RECENT DEVElOPlliENTS 
A retroactive applica-
tion of an amendment that re-
stricted useof26 U.S.C. § 2057 
(1982, Supp. IV 1986), which 
allowed for a deduction of half 
the proceeds of a sale of em-
ployer securities by the execu-
tor of an estate to an employee 
stock ownership plan r'ESOP"), 
washeldto benon-violative ofthe 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The United States 
Supreme Court, in UnitedStates 
v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 
(1994), applied the rational ba-
sis test to the amendment and 
ruled that the retroactive appli-
cation was rationally related to 
its legislative purpose. 
Jerry W. Carlton 
("Carlton") was the executor 
of the estate of Willametta K. 
Day ("Day"). On December 
10,1986, Carlton purchased 1.5 
million shares ofMCI Commu-
nications Corporation with es-
tate funds at an average share 
price of $7.47 per share. On 
December 12, 1986, Carlton 
sold all of the MCI stock to the 
MCI ESOP at an average share 
price of $7.05 per share. On 
December 29, 1986, Carlton 
filed an estate tax return claim-
ing a deduction under § 2057 of 
$5,287,000.00, half the pro-
ceeds of the sale to the MCI 
ESOP. 
On January 5,1987, the 
Internal Revenue Service 
("IRS"), awaiting the enact-
ment of actual legislation (the 
amendment to § 2057), stated 
that the § 2057 deduction could 
be used by estates of decedents 
only in cases where the stock in 
question was owned by the de-
cedent immediately prior to 
death. The amendment to § 
2057 was finally enacted on 
December 22, 1987. It was 
made effective as if contained 
in the statute originally enacted 
in October 1986. 
The IRS disallowed 
Carlton's deduction under § 
2057 because the MCI stock 
had not been owned by Day 
immediately prior to her death. 
Carlton was assessed a tax defi-
ciency which he paid with inter-
est. He filed a claim for a refund 
and initiated a refund action in 
the United States District Court 
for the Central District of Cali-
fomia. He conceded that the 
estate did not qualify for a de-
duction under § 2057, but ar-
gued that retroactive applica-
tion of the amendment to the 
estate's 1986 transactions vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. The dis-
trict court rejected this argu-
ment and granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the United 
States. 
The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
considering two factors to be of 
importance when determining 
whether retroactive application 
of a tax violates due process. 
The first factor was whether the 
taxpayer had actual or construc-
tive notice that the statute would 
be retroactively amended. The 
second factor was whether the 
taxpayer reasonably relied to 
his detriment on the statute be-
fore its amendment. The court 
ruled that retroactive applica-
tion of the amendment was un-
duly harsh and oppressive and 
thus violative of due process. 
Justice Blackmun, de-
livering the opinion for the 
United States Supreme Court, 
began the analysis by stating 
that "[t]his Court repeatedly 
has upheld retroactive tax legis-
lation against a due process chal-
lenge." I d. at 2021. The Court 
noted that the "harsh and op-
pressive" formulation does not 
differ in substance from the pro-
hibition against arbitrary and ir-
rational legislation with regard 
to economic policy. Id. at 2022. 
Hence, the due process test to 
be applied to tax statutes with 
retroactive effect is the rational 
basis test. Under this test, the 
legitimate legislative purpose of 
the statute must be furthered by 
rational means. Id. 
The Court found that in 
enacting § 2057, Congress never 
intended the statute to have such 
a broad application. The intent 
was to create an incentive for 
shareholders to sell to the em-
ployees, those who helped build 
the company. Id. 
The Supreme Court 
concludedthatthe 1987 amend-
ment did not violate due pro-
cess. First, the Court stated that 
Congress acted "to correct what 
it reasonably viewed as a mis-
take in the original 1986 provi-
sion that would have created a 
significant and unanticipated 
revenue loss." Id. at 2023. 
Second, Congress had acted 
promptly and the period of 
retroactivity was only modest. 
Id. 
The Court rejected 
Carlton's argument that he re-
lied on the original provision by 
noting that "[t]ax legislation is 
not a promise, and a taxpayer 
has no vested right in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code." Id. In 
addition, the Court rejected 
Carlton's lack of notice argu-
ment by quoting Milliken v. 
United States, 283 U.S. 15,23 
(1931): "a taxpayer 'should be 
regarded as taking his chances 
of any increase in the tax burden 
which might result from carry-
ing out the established policy of 
taxation. '" Id. . 
Justice Scalia, in a con-
curring opinion in which Justice 
Thomas joined, obviously irri-
tated by the majority's opinion, 
began his analysis by stating: 
"If I thought that 'substantive 
due process' were a constitu-
tional right rather than an oxy-
moron, I would think it violated 
by bait-and-switch taxation." 
Id. at 2026. Scalia critiqued the 
Court's characterization of the 
amendment as "a curative mea-
sure" and stated that "what was 
done to respondent here went 
beyond a 'cure.''' Id. Henoted 
that the retroactive disallow-
ance of the tax benefit that the 
earlier law allowed, without 
compensating those who in-
curred expenses by accepting 
the offer, is "harsh and oppres-
sive by any normal measure." 
Id. 
Scalia did, however, 
express agreement with the 
Court that the Due Process 
Clause does allow for retroac-
tive taxation, since he believes 
that the Clause "guarantees no 
substantive rights, but only (as 
it says) process .... " Id. at 
2027. 
In summary, the Su-
preme Court held in United 
States v. Carlton that a retroac-
tive amendment restricting use 
ofa deduction under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 2057 (1982, Supp. IV 1986) 
was not violative of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. While such an 
amendment may not violate due 
process, it certainly violates this 
author's perception of what a 
free market economy should be. 
lt is beyond comprehension that 
some legislators fail to see that 
what is best for the economy is 
to keep this country's assets in 
the hands of private individuals. 
lt is only private individuals that 
have an incentive to efficiently 
and productively use these as-
sets. lt is only private individu-
als that have a "bottom line" to 
worry about. The federal gov-
ernment has no such bottom line 
to worry about, despite its claims 
to the contrary. 
The reason for the 
amendment to § 2057 was be-
cause of an unanticipated rev-
enue loss by the government of 
$7 billion over a five-year pe-
riod. The loss of $7 billion in 
revenue over a five-year period 
is a minuscule amount given the 
size of the United State's 
economy as measured by gross 
domestic product, or any stan-
dard of measurement for that 
matter. However, I am sure that 
the revenue provided by the 
amendment will be put to good 
use by the federal government. 
I understand that the money is 
ear-marked for the coffers of 
such successful programs as 
welfare, the illicit drug importa-
tion war, and the space pro-
gram. Good luck middle-class 
America. 
- Paul J. Mantell 
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